

THE ROLE OF IDENTITY IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR INDONESIA

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Abstrak:

Salah satu reaksi terhadap globalisasi adalah menguatnya identitas-identitas lokal yang beranak pinak menjadi gerakan separatisme, fanatisme agama, dan gerakan primordialisme. Konflik-konflik yang bermunculan di penghujung abad 20 ditandai dengan konflik identitas dan kepentingan. Karena itu perhatian dan studi tentang identitas menjadi begitu penting untuk kepentingan proses perdamaian. Sumbangan dari dunia akademis ini sangat dinantikan oleh para *peace maker* mengingat makin massif dan banyaknya konflik antar negara, golongan, maupun agama yang terjadi. Dalam proses perdamaian di Irlandia Utara terlihat bagaimana peran identitas itu begitu kental. Tulisan ini mencoba membedah problem perdamaian di Irlandia Utara itu dari kacamata *identity theory*. Dengan pemahaman yang lebih baik atas masing-masing kubu yang bertikai, tulisan ini memberikan rekomendasi bahwa proses perdamaian yang selama ini telah ditempuh perlu dirombak ulang. Proses ini kiranya relevan bagi Indonesia

Key words:

Identity, Peace, Security, Realist

1. Introduction

Identity is a term used in many academic disciplines especially in relations to individual human beings. This essay, however, will try to explore the role of identity within international relations with special reference to the peace process in Northern Ireland. To do so it is necessary to first look more generally at some different schools within international relations and their understanding of identity. In this essay I will examine the role of identity in those schools.

In a second step will I try to apply some of the theory about identity to the developments of the peace process in Northern Ireland, looking first at the involvement of the states of Ireland, Britain and the USA before looking closer at the different communities in Northern Ireland and the influence of the peace process to their identities. In the end, I will give a hint to the Indonesian cases.

2. Identity in International Relations

Within International Relations there are numerous different definitions of identity. The major difference appears to be about the origin of identity; where it comes from, and who or what “makes” it. It is possible to distinguish two different approaches to this question: identity as either fixed or constructed. As we will see, answering the question with one or the other will lead to completely different accounts of the centrality of identity in international relations. A second distinction can be made about the role of interests in the context of identity and the overall implications of identity for the concept of security.

2.1 Identity: Fixed or Constructed?

In the Realist tradition identity is usually seen as a fixed entity unable to change under any circumstances. Morgenthau defines human beings as egoistic by nature – a feature that forms the structure of behaviour and is reflected by the selfish behaviour of states in the international order.¹ If this is true, identity is almost a biological matter, unchangeable and deeply rooted within humans, as if determined by their genetic code.

Some assumptions about the underlying concept of identity for the Neo-Realist Kenneth Waltz can be revealed by looking closely at his theory: Conflict at any level, ranging from the individual to the international, is seen as unavoidable if not constrained by government. For Waltz since it is impossible for there to be a global government, the system of anarchy will always rule the international order and states have to engage in a self-help system; any attempt to escape the system will be punished by it.²

What does this imply for the concept of identity? If states cannot act in any other way than the system is allowing them, there is no space for a change of identity at all. Actually, if everyone behaves according to the same pattern, identity becomes even unnecessary since no distinction between actors is possible. Indeed, Alexander Wendt observes similarly that in a realist concept co-operative behaviour in the anarchic self-help system is strategic and only implies a change of behaviour but never a change of identity.³

Wendt as a Social Constructivist defines identity as “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self.”⁴ ‘Relatively’ already implies that here identity is not fixed. Identity is shaped on a relational basis; it is interaction that makes actors form concepts of self and other. The same is true for institutions which are formed cognitively by the actors.⁵ There is no identity before and independent of action.⁶ How much this identity formation relies on cognitive acts becomes clear when Wendt speaks of how “actors

can engage in self-reflection and practice specifically designed to transform their identities and interests.”⁷ Against the Realist concept, therefore, Wendt defines state behaviour not as formed by structure but by practices; changing the actions would imply a change of identity.⁸ A “mirror theory of identity-formation” forms a state’s identity as a reflection of another state’s practice.⁹

Both accounts given on identity so far concentrate more or less strongly on interstate behaviour; however, it seems difficult to apply them in a satisfactory way to ethnic conflicts that frequently happen within states. This observation has led to a reconsideration of the traditional understanding of security by the so-called Copenhagen School: “This was a theoretical challenge, because these issues were not simply absent in the sense that classical security studies did not care; they were radically absent because they *could not* be represented in the classical state-centric theory”¹⁰.

Though coming from a realist tradition and still seeing state security as a major issue they eventually developed an approach called “Societal Security.”¹¹ A dual security system is established being fundamentally about survival: of the state and of society. For the state sovereignty becomes the central feature, identity is seen as central for the survival of society: “if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as ‘us’.”¹² They perceive identity as neither fixed nor constructed and yet both.

They seem to make a distinction between different levels of identity: though they acknowledge that a society consists of numerous sub-groups - each equipped with a distinct identity - the only one they understand to be stable is societal identity: “societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.”¹³ If ‘essential character’ is here used as a synonym for identity, it implies a fixed or at least a stable understanding. Indeed, they mention that their focus is on “established” identities. Though they see identity as socially constructed in its origin, they feel the need to observe identity as a “thing” or a “product”, finally “sedimented” in society so that it can be studied in their terms.¹⁴

Of central importance for the construction of identity for McSweeney is the recursive relationship between agency and structure called “social practice”: it is regular behaviour in order to make action meaningful that connects agency and structure.¹⁵ Routine can be seen as a synonym for structure; it allows for social action but at the same time it is formed by action through those who act.¹⁶ Identity, therefore, is a combination of human choice but at the same time that choice is restricted by routine.

This understanding of identity is different from the Realist position shown above. In the sense that there is a choice in the formation of identity and no external structure that determines it; identity is constructed. But at the same time it is different from Wendt's purely cognitive approach, since the choice of identity is constrained by a structure of routine.¹⁷

In the Realist fixed understanding the subordination of structure over identity leaves no space for development or change within international relations. Besides, its focus on the state seems incomplete. Wendt's approach on the other hand leaves space for development and learning in the international arena; he, however, focuses very much on the state again and neglects collective and individual identity. The Copenhagen School tries to address this weakness by focusing only on societal identity but stays at a superficial level.

Wendt's and McSweeney's approaches provide answers to the origins of structure and leave at the time space for development. McSweeney's concept of a recursive relationship between agency and routine as basis for identity pays attention to structure but can also explain its origin in human agency and habit. This approach makes more sense than some sort of structure completely independent from humans.

2.2 Identity and Interests. A Matter of Security?

All the approaches shown above that see identity as constructed recognise the difficulties such a change has to face.¹⁸ Seeing identity as constructed does not yet explain how a change of identity can be brought about. In this section the focus will be to analyse the problem of change and its relation to interests. Eventually the focus will be on how this can be related to security.

The states in Waltz's self-help system only follow their own interests; co-operation is only a temporary strategic occurrence, a behaviour encouraged by the structure of anarchy under certain circumstances and best described as balance of power.¹⁹ International relations are consequently driven by interests alone, not by identity.

Wendt on the other hand, perceives interests as inferior to identity; it is identity that forms interests and not the other way round. Interests are formed according to identity roles and the expectations that go along with them.²⁰ Although they are dependent on actors in the sense that they are constructed by their cognitive identity formation, Wendt acknowledges that institutions are experienced as real and superior to individuals, experienced as "coercive social fact."²¹ In them he locates the resistance to a change of identity: It is coercive in the sense that it encourages some behaviour as opposed to others.²² This consequently means that Wendt does not deny Waltz's system

of anarchy and self-help; it may be socially constructed but once established, it is very persuasive and real. Also the desire to maintain a stable identity, considerations about the costs of breaking established commitments, and opposition to challenges that can be perceived as threats to the identity are identified as factors making change of identity difficult.

This approach is interesting since it takes into account that on the international stage self-help is a common occurrence; but at the same time it does not accept it as given and unchangeable, but tries to explore the mechanisms that facilitate it. Revealing those mechanisms could provide a powerful instrument to change the ways of the world.

The Wendt's theory intend to overcome the obstacles to identity formation, that is : "new ideas about self and other must transcend [these obstacles]."²³ This implies a strong element of choice and cognition but does not really explain why actors should take the effort to transcend obstacles at all.

McSweeney is very suspicious of Wendt's purely cognitive approach for exactly the same reason: what makes actors change their identity? Both, Wendt and McSweeney agree that material forces alone are of little value on their own; rather that it is actors who give them meaning or no meaning at all: "if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, 'the cold war is over'"²⁴ "If Spaniards stop believing in the conflict with ETA, westerners in the conflict with the Soviet Union, and British with the IRA, these conflicts are over."²⁵ But for McSweeney interests also play a vital role in the formation and change of identity:

It is idealistic to imagine that individuals or collectives, socialized by habit and history into a particular sense of self, will choose to change without the incentive or pressure of self-interest.²⁶

"Choose to change" implies a constructivist approach like Wendt's, but at the same time the term "self-interest" implies that choice is not the only component in identity formation. As has been the case with agency and structure, he also sees identity and interests as recursive. Not only does identity form interests but interests can also influence who one wants to be.²⁷ McSweeney's position combines and rejects at the same time both realism with its focus on material interests as well as a purely cognitive approach like Wendt's.²⁸

In order to understand the connections between identity, interests, and security fully, it is at this point necessary to look at the underlying concepts of security. For the Realists, security is a matter of survival on the interstate level, identity is of no importance since the structure makes states only act

according to their interests, namely self-interests. This understanding of security is very one-dimensional since it rules out any possibility of change from the beginning through the establishment of a fixed structure and since it simplifies security problems on national levels leaving it to the state to deal with it.

Wendt also focuses on state security and shows no interest in sub-state security. Nonetheless his approach could offer possibilities for the establishment of a security policy: States can learn to change their identities if they choose to do so from self-help to co-operation.

The focus of the Copenhagen School on societal identity tries to shift the focus away from the state in their concept of societal security, but they do not progress beyond this point. Establishing identity as a matter for society neglects deeper layers of identity like sub-societal groups as can be found in Northern Ireland.

McSweeney on the other hand, offers an approach to security that does not follow hierarchic structures but is rather a bottom up theory which focuses on the individual as the referent of security. A positive understanding focused on human needs as opposed to an understanding focused purely on survival is to be established.²⁹ Individuals are seen as the agents that form collective, societal and state identity and behaviour.³⁰ This approach also leaves more possibilities for security policy since survival is not the only interest at its heart.

Establishing identity and interests in a recursive relationship implies more than just combining cognitive and material elements. It implies that identities can be influenced from the outside by influencing interests. McSweeney uses even stronger terms: he speaks of management, manipulation and even seduction. These terms should not be understood in the negative sense in which they are usually perceived; rather they should be seen as a chance for security or even a peace process.³¹

This thesis seems very challenging, especially with reference to ethnic conflicts that are usually perceived as being primarily about identity. Can approaching material interests really alter these strong divisions? Furthermore, can interests be especially managed and manipulated in order to achieve peace, and by whom?

3. The Peace Process in Northern Ireland

The signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Belfast in April 1998 came as a surprise to many who had seen the conflicting identities in Northern Ireland as irreconcilable.

For a long time, peace did not seem possible in Northern Ireland; the two communities found themselves in fierce opposition, none of them willing to move an inch towards the other. Compromise was not a term usually used by Unionists or Nationalists: “No first step *because* it is a step towards Irish unity (the Unionist position); no first step *unless* it is a step towards Irish unity (the Nationalist position).”³² What Aughey rightly called a “zero-sum game”³³ seems to fit in perfectly with a realist concept (though not at state level): the actors were only concerned with relative gains, non willing to see the wider picture.

How then, was such a drastic change possible? Aughey speaks of “... conditions [that] existed” and of a “dream dreamed”³⁴ that made it happen. But was it really a “victory of people over structures, an expression of the democratic will to redefine the collective identities which had endured over centuries to generate the violence of Northern Ireland?”³⁵

This section will look closer at the ‘conditions’ and what constituted them and if really a dream was dreamt in Northern Ireland or if the events there were not driven by what McSweeney called a “seduction model of integration?”³⁶

In a first step this section will investigate the role of Ireland, Britain and the USA in the peace process. The second step will look closely at the Nationalist and Unionist traditions in Northern Ireland, trying to discover the impact of the peace process on their identities.

3.1 Manipulation of Interests: The Role of the Ireland, Britain and the US

The Irish constitution had held in the articles 2 and 3 the claim of the territorial unity of the island of Ireland including Northern Ireland. This claim showed Ireland’s firm ideological support for unity with Northern Ireland (at least on paper), was of central importance for the Nationalist movement in the North and formed the basis for the armed struggle of the IRA. Nonetheless the majority of the population of the Republic of Ireland and the majority of the Nationalist community in the North voted in favour of an agreement that would change the territorial claim of the constitution into a birthright for inhabitants of Northern Ireland to have Irish nationality. What made the Republic of Ireland change its constitution in such an important matter?

Besides the fact that maybe the attachment of the Republic to Northern Ireland was never as strong as Nationalists wanted to believe, a major turning point in the attitude of the Republic over Northern Ireland can be associated with the establishment of the so-called New Ireland Forum in 1983; its purpose was to re-examine what Nationalism meant for Ireland at the end of the 20th

century, to explicitly re-define Nationalism and its impact on Unionism in favour of a more pluralist attitude.³⁷

The mere existence of such an attempt appears to be a proof of Wendt's cognitive identity theory; certainly the people of Ireland wanted to change their identity but still, this attempt cannot be seen as detached from certain developments in the Republic of Ireland. Firstly, the on-going secularisation that transformed and still transforms Irish identity certainly made it easier to open towards the Unionist identity. Furthermore, the conflict between Thatcher's Conservative government and the IRA had reached a very violent and critical phase; Thatcher's unwillingness to compromise during hunger strikes for example had ensured Sinn Fein's electoral success: a trend that the Irish government wanted to oppose.³⁸

Not only did the Forum redefine the Nationalist identity; it also came up with possible solutions for the future of Northern Ireland that already reached far beyond the traditional constitutional claims of article 2 and 3: "a unitary Irish state, a federal or confederal state and joint authority."³⁹ Although these solutions were rejected by the British government London nonetheless signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement shortly after in 1985, which included a consultative role for the Dublin government, acknowledging that the Troubles in Northern Ireland were no longer an internal matter but "were the business of both Dublin and London."⁴⁰

Mrs Thatcher, who was traditionally seen as a defender of the Union, make such a concession that gave Ireland such an important role in the decision making of the future of Northern Ireland. One reason was certainly an unexpected involvement of the Reagan administration in favour of the Agreement. Although the United States had at some points during the Troubles criticised the British government for its role in Northern Ireland, the involvement of the US government in the conflict in Northern Ireland was traditionally very low. But from the mid 1970s the Irish government -especially through the influence of SDLP leader John Hume- had tried to influence Irish-American congress members to support a peaceful settlement for Northern Ireland as opposed to those Irish-Americans who funded the IRA.⁴¹ The US involvement for the Anglo-Irish Agreement shows the success of such an attempt.

The Irish government, however, cannot be seen as the sole winner of the Agreement. It had to pay for its consultative role with the acceptance of the principle of consent that "any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland."⁴²

Concerning the role of the British government- other, more material factors must also be taken into consideration. Since the partition in 1922 Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and the Protestant majority of the North closely associated and still associates with the Union. Northern Ireland had once been of some importance in economic and strategic terms for the United Kingdom, especially during the two World Wars, however this changed drastically. By the beginning of the 1990s security expenditure and the highest unemployment rate of the UK⁴³ turned Northern Ireland into an extremely costly province.⁴⁴ The statement of the Secretary of State Peter Brooke later mirrored by the British government in the so-called Downing Street Declaration: "that they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland"⁴⁵ does not show the same kind of attachment from the British governments towards the Northern Irish Unionists, especially since public support for the Union with Northern Ireland on the British mainland diminished strongly.⁴⁶ Even stronger, McSweeney states that Britain certainly had a selfish interest in Northern Ireland which was to get rid of it and that many aspects of British behaviour were not actually neutral to the future status of Northern Ireland but rather encouraging devolution.⁴⁷ This trend could already be observed in the signing of the Ireland Act in 1949 which already stated the principle of consent.⁴⁸ The secret talks in which the British government were involved with Sinn Fein from 1989 onwards can also be seen in this light.

Again, American influence was a key element for the negotiations between the Conservative party, (now under John Major) and the Nationalists and the subsequent signing of the Downing Street Declaration by the British and Irish governments in 1993, especially since the Conservatives depended more and more on Unionist votes.⁴⁹

The involvement of the White House into Northern Irish affairs had reached a completely different scale after the election of President Clinton. It is not completely clear what the reason for Clinton's commitment were, but amongst his dislike for John Major and pressure from influential Irish-Americans, one major reason contributing to that development was certainly the end of the cold war. The 'special relationship' that had linked the US and Britain during the cold war suddenly was not that important any more. The US could afford to offend its ally to a certain extent and it did, by not considering the affairs in Northern Ireland as a purely British matter anymore.⁵⁰ The end of the cold war also left US foreign policy somewhat disorientated at the beginning of the Clinton era and Northern Ireland might have provided a manageable, reasonably inexpensive opportunity with some prospects of success to give it a new profile and maybe even attract voters in the US.⁵¹ It seems of identity formation through interests.

That is why the Clinton administration involved in Northern Ireland? One example was to strongly encourage Sinn Fein and especially Gerry Adams to convince the IRA to engage in the peace process. The highly controversial visas to the USA granted to Gerry Adams during the St. Patrick's days of 1994 and 1995 were not primarily intended to annoy John Major and the Unionists: rather they were intended to improve Adam's influence within the IRA. The flattering admission to the White House was also part of a bargain; admission had to be seen in exchange for a stronger commitment of Sinn Fein to accept the Downing Street Declaration.⁵² Although the commitment of the US government was much in favour of the Nationalist tradition, it was said to have no hidden agenda by being involved in Northern Ireland and soon tried to appear very balanced in its attention to both sides of the divide, realising that this was necessary to achieve anything.⁵³ The election of the Labour party in Britain in 1997 helped the peace process further. They did not depend on Unionist votes and came along to "modernise Britain", furthermore the relationship between Clinton and Blair was on much better terms; Blair actually welcomed and encouraged the US involvement in the peace process, a move that strengthened the influence of the Clinton Administration.⁵⁴

Economic aspects also played a vital role in convincing the conflicting parties to go along with the peace process. The US encouraged companies to invest in Northern Ireland and even set up Investment Conferences for Northern Ireland in 1995 and 1996.⁵⁵ 'No secret agenda' was maybe not as true as the White House wanted the Unionists to believe: "In the Clinton catechism, peace, stability and prosperity are very much linked."⁵⁶ Certainly the US economy profits from a stable Northern Ireland as one of its gates into the European market but this does not diminish the fact that the consequences of these investments were certainly felt in Northern Ireland by Nationalists and Unionists alike. Financial support had also been part of the strategy of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and had successfully employed the help of the US, Canada, New Zealand which deliberately influenced the peace process with generous financial support for the Northern Irish economy.⁵⁷ Further examples are the support of the EU into reconciliation projects announced after the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 and the promise of huge financial support by Britain coinciding with the advent of the referendum about the Belfast Agreement in 1998.⁵⁸

So what was/is the driving force behind the Northern Irish peace process? From what has been observed so far, certain assumptions about the nature of the process can be made. Firstly, apparently support for the peace process, best visible in the outcome of the referendum in 1998, did not solely reflect a collective decision by the people of Northern Ireland to overcome old divisions and identities in favour of a new shared identity. Many external factors

seemed to contribute to the outcome, including governmental and economic decisions to influence the peace process in a certain direction. Secondly, these external factors cannot be seen as arbitrary but as deliberately employed by Ireland, Britain and the US to come to a settlement in Northern Ireland. These strategies again, cannot be seen as independent moral decisions either, as has been shown above, but have to be put in context with concrete more or less selfish interests of each of the three states involved.

The process shown above so far certainly meets with McSweeney's description of the seduction model of integration: "Seduction hints at conspiracy, at the conscious manipulation of others' identities and interests, as it hints also at human agency- influenced, but not determined, in its role as co-conspirator"⁵⁹.

How successful the strategy has been employed, however, cannot be fully answered without looking closer at the Nationalist and Unionist identities and their responses to the peace process.

3.2 A Real Change of Identity in Northern Ireland?

The two divided communities in Northern Ireland respond to the peace process. At first glance, the strategy employed by the Irish, British and US governments appears to be fruitful: the renouncement of violence, especially by the IRA and all-party negotiations that actually led to an agreement supported by the majority of the people of Northern Ireland are only some evidence for it.

The traditional aim of Nationalism is the establishment of a united Ireland, be it through peaceful means like the SDLP or through the armed struggle that the IRA had employed. The Irish constitution had always supported this aim of unity in the articles 2 and 3 of the constitution claiming territorial jurisdiction over the island as a whole. In the referendum about the Good Friday Agreement Nationalists gave up maybe not their aim but certainly the ideological claim for a united Ireland and exchanged it for the political principle of consent, recognising the rights of Unionists to be in Ireland for the first time. Earlier through the ceasefires of 1994 and 1997 the IRA had already shown its willingness to do so by renouncing violence. To say that this came about through the "acknowledgement by Republicans that their long war of attrition against Unionists and the British state had been a failure"⁶⁰ is naïve. Rather it has to be seen as a product of negotiations and persuasions and a re-defining of interests.

The New Ireland Forum redefining Nationalism towards Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement has proved to Nationalist hardliners in Northern

Ireland that the Irish government was willing to accept partition in favour of the principle of consent.⁶¹ This apparent lack of support, surely contributed to Sinn Fein's redefinition of its goal. But also the Anglo-Irish Agreement empowered Irish influence over Northern Ireland which certainly was perceived as positive. Intense negotiations between John Hume and Gerry Adams and later between Sinn Fein and the British government provided the soil for the IRA ceasefire. The possibility for political participation offered by the British government through the Downing Street Declaration can be described as the carrot pulling Sinn Fein into all-party negotiations finally exchanging their territorial claim against political power.

The matter is more complicated with Unionism. One should not make the mistake to perceive Unionism as a closed unit; Unionism has always been divided into different sub-groups, as the huge variety of Unionist political parties indicates. Indeed, Morrow states that "Unionism is a movement whose unity consists largely in its common rejection of all things Nationalist."⁶² This is a very wide definition of Unionism leaving room for the numerous varieties within Unionism. Still, the peace process shows significant differences in the rejection of Nationalism and the term 'all things' might be a little too far fetched. It is true, however, that for a long time common Unionist political strategy was to oppose any attempts to engage in power-sharing with the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland.⁶³ This strategy had been employed fairly successfully with the most prominent example simply but very effectively striking to death the power-sharing executive set up by the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974.

When in 1985 the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, it came as a shock for the Unionist community. They had not expected such a move from the Conservative Thatcher government in the first place and consequently felt betrayed. With the establishment of the intergovernmental conference, Dublin was given power over Northern Ireland which was seen as a strong threat to the Union. Although the Agreement was still based on the principle of consent, Unionists felt sold out, especially since they felt that they had been given no chance to politically influence the Agreement. Strong opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement was the consequence and therefore, Unionists made attempts to deal with it as usual. But things were different this time. Although Unionists tried to bring the Agreement to an end by non co-operation they did little harm to it and in 1989 the two governments even renewed their commitment to it. Economic factors may also be a reason of the lack of success of the boycott of the Agreement: the Northern Irish economy was very weak at that time and strikes therefore did not have the same impact as a decade earlier.⁶⁴ Unionists soon realised that political abstinence did not have the wished-for success and the fear of further exclusion from decision making as exercised in

the Anglo-Irish Agreement made them finally engage in talks with the British government and other Northern Irish parties.⁶⁵ Economic factors played a stronger role in convincing Unionists to go along than it had for Nationalists. The fear of a united Ireland was certainly not only a result of anti-Catholicism but also strengthened by the fact, that Ireland was one of the poorest countries of the European union. But it is naïve to expect that these attempts were not recognised by Unionists. The reactions to it within Unionism are divided. On the one side there is the strongly religious Unionism very much influenced by Paisley's warning against such attempts of bribery and especially US American involvement considered as international conspiracy led by the Vatican.⁶⁶ There is no doubt that something like a conspiracy was at work although not directed by the Vatican. Anti-Catholicism is not easy to overcome in Northern Ireland and even today many Unionists are strongly influenced by it.⁶⁷

On the other side there is a recognition of the inevitability of change and the attempts to make the best out of it: "Economic co-operation, we trust, is no longer advanced as a strategy for creeping unification, After the Agreement there is no longer any need to engage in such tactical manoeuvres and a growth in co-operation is consequently possible"⁶⁸. Though David Trimble certainly realised that the Agreement did not stop the strategy of economic co-operation, it acknowledges the advantages of economic improvement and tries to orientate itself along these lines.

Unionism consequently still involves an element of fear of a Roman Catholic Ireland trying to invade Northern Ireland. But on the other hand, they have realised that a transformation in the South has taken place which diminishes the power of the church and see co-operation therefore as less threatening. Besides, the economic development of Ireland into the "Celtic Tiger" certainly helped a new perception of Ireland on its way.

The changes within Northern Irish society are not easy to grasp. It seems that a constant combination of pushing and pulling of the conflicting parties—a strategy of the carrot and the stick—made participation in the peace process easier. Still, the peace process is not finished yet and the realisation of the Good Friday Agreement has in some aspects proven to be very difficult as the on-going problem about the decommissioning of the IRA suggests.

The avoidance of new elections in Northern Ireland by the British government shows that they are well aware of the fragility of the peace process. Also, though paramilitary violence is decreasing, sectarianism is still very alive and well as the example of the Holy Cross primary school issue shows.

It seems that manipulation of interests can be employed as a support for a peace process but that also the participants must show some willingness

to change. There is always the possibility that some identities willingly resist manipulation of their interests as is the case with some Unionists. Here the cognitive element comes into play. McSweeney describes it best when he states:

Both parties to the Northern Ireland conflict are being seduced into a new set of practices and a new habit of identity, in the sense that both must weigh the advantages and perils of a reconstructed narrative, compatible with new interests, against the old one – which was no less a product of elite management of material and cultural factors than the one on offer today.⁶⁹

4. The Relevance for Indonesia

I contend that a broader understanding of identity should also create moderate solutions towards several peace processes in Indonesia. Just to mention one among many, East Timorese refugees in Indonesian border are victims of so called International political change. The rise of the Communist Party in East Timor frightened the US Administrations during the Cold War. Using the *International Military Education and Training* (IMET) Program, US forced Indonesian Military Government to annex East Timor. But soon after the Cold War era, the downfall of the Soviet Union brought change in International politics as well as US policy. US Administration under Clinton strongly criticized the role of the Indonesian army in relation to human rights abuses in East Timor. It affected International economic support for Indonesia which required human right implementation in East Timor. We noted that Indonesia was not US privilege any more. With International pressure on Indonesia, East Timor got its independence finally. But thousands of them as refugees are still in the border of West Timor. Seems that they do not want to return to their homeland, but on the other hands their reception from Indonesian side is a half hearted policy. Living in the refugee camp for such a long time can trigger potential riot in the future.

As the Northern Ireland case shows what we regard as Indonesia not only depends on domestic understanding but also on International recognition and political changes. Several other cases in Indonesia such as the Papuan Independent Movement or Acehese Movement, conflicts in Moluccas and Poso reveal to us that what we regard as Indonesia is still a long way to perceive and lots of study should be done.

5. Conclusion

As the example of Northern Ireland has shown, the role of identity in international relations is a complex issue. Firstly, it seems that internal conflicts

are not left to be resolved by the state alone any more, as the Realists would claim. The involvement of the US government in the conflict transcends this Realist concept and gives an internal conflict international attention. Secondly, it has to be taken into account that state identities are not purely an international matter as Waltz and Wendt suggest. Neither are state identities determined by the international self-help system, nor are they purely formed by international interaction forming the concept of self and other. State identity is not only driven by international structures, but also involves domestic factors. The US get involved in the Northern Irish conflict, because it also followed domestic interests like influencing voters or serving their own economy. The same applies for the British government; their position in the peace process was influenced by international factors like their relationship to Ireland and the US, but there was also a strong domestic influence like the diminishing support for the Union in Great Britain and the high costs of maintaining it.

Thirdly, the reasons for the state behaviour shown above are all connected to interests, domestic and international. None of the state involvements in the peace process are based on a purely moral choice. I do not deny that the motive to bring peace and stability to Northern Ireland for its own sake did not play a role but it was certainly helped by interests. The identity of the US under Bill Clinton for example appeared to be characterised by a strong involvement in peace keeping and in the facilitating of peace processes

The concept of identity in international relations is therefore of some importance but has to be seen in a complex relationship of cognitive and material, of domestic and international, of state, sub-state and individual factors.

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Endnotes:

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- 2 K. N Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power", 98.
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- 32 A. Aughey, *Nationalism, Devolution and the Challenge to the United Kingdom State*, 129.
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- 38 B. McSweeney, "Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland", 1967-1968.
- 39 S. Farren, "The SDLP and the Good Friday Agreement", 51.
- 40 C. Kennedy-Pipe, "From War to Peace in Northern Ireland", 32.
- 41 R. MacGinty, "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process"; B. McSweeney, "Interests and Identity in the Construction of the Belfast Agreement", 307.
- 42 K. Boyle, et al, *Northern Ireland. The Choice*, 121.
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- 44 B. McSweeney, "Interests and Identity in the Construction of the Belfast Agreement", 310-311.
- 45 "Joint Declaration on Peace (Downing Street Declaration) 15 December 1993", 328.
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- 48 H. Patterson, 'Northern Ireland 1921-68', 9. Note that the Ireland Act refers to the then still existing Northern Irish parliament.
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- 50 A. Wilson, "The Billy Boys Meet Slick Willy: The Ulster Unionist Party and the American Dimension to the Northern Ireland Peace Process 1994-9", 122; W. Hazleton, "Encouragement from the Sidelines: Clinton's Role in the Good Friday Agreement", 106 ; M. Cox, "Blind Alleys. Thinking 'Globally' about Peace in Northern Ireland", 63.
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- 67 For details see J. Brewer, *Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland. 1600-1998. The Mote and the Beam*, 122-127.
- 68 David Trimble in an address to the Irish Association in November 1998, Quoted in A. Aughey, "The 1998 Agreement: Unionist Responses", 68.
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