UC Journal, e-ISSN 2774-9401, Vol. 3, No. 1, May 2022, pp. 89-106

UC Journal: ELT, Linguistics and Literature Journal
http://e-journal.usd.ac.id/index.php/UC
Sanata Dharma University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

THE MANIFESTATION OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE KISWAHILI RELIGIOUS NEWSPAPERS DURING 2015 ELECTIONS

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https://doi.org/10.24071/uc.v3i1.4807
received 6 May 2022; accepted 23 June 2022

Abstract

There has been a constant power struggle and unstable religious relations between Christians and Muslims in Tanzania, especially during elections. Many scholars have approached the issue of interreligious relations from the political and social dimensions, and no critical analysis on the role of religious newspapers in exacerbating such struggle and relations. This article analyzes the stories related to religious and political relations in Tanzania as religious newspapers framed them in 2015. The study used data from four selected religious newspapers published from January to December 2015 and used data from interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The selected headlines were analysed using three dimensions of Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA) propounded by Norman Fairclough. The study found that the framing of election stories was affected by the religious biases of the newspapers. The analysis further shows that the religious newspapers in 2015 presented the mistrust between Christians and Muslims. It was found that Muslims mobilised fellow Muslims to change the Christian-dominated Government because Muslims' interests have been ignored for many years. The article concludes that when the inequality grows and is left unaddressed, it leads to social unrest.

Keywords: framing, journalism, religion, politics

Introduction

There are various studies on the state of inter-religious relations in Tanzania (Tambila, 2006; Wijsen, 2007; Rukyaa, 2007; Said, 2010; Glickman, 2011; LeSage, 2014; Mesaki, 2011; Tetti, 2014; Lawi, 2015; Lucia, 2015; Lupa, 2015; Ndaluka, 2015, and others). Except for a few studies like that of Said (2010), Mukandala *et al*. (2006), Mbogoni (2004), most studies have looked at Islam as the source of religious tensions in the country. Most studies have been presenting that there is a rivalry between the Islamic religion and the State. For example, Rukyaa (2010: 4 - 11) attributes religious tensions and conflicts to the prejudiced religious teachings and the dirty campaigns of some Muslim elites.

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Other similar studies (LeSage, 2014; Lawi, 2015; Lucia, 2015; and Ndaluka, 2015) have explained bitter Christian-Muslim relations in Tanzania based on economic, historical, and social claims, not religious interests per se. However, they all commonly argue that Muslims have been more dissatisfied with the way social and public resources are used in the country. For example, Ndaluka (2015: 36 – 37) argues that these claims (by Muslims) are for demanding access to public resources such as education and government jobs. Moreover, these claims are not confined to socio-economic resources but also cultural and political relations.

The argument that the source of tension between Christians and Muslims being attributed to cultural and political relations might hold water as it has been indicated by Said (2010: 6), who is directly quoted here:

> …we need to come into terms with the reality that the Church particularly the Catholic Church is in control of the Government by proxy. Through unseen hands it manipulates the political system in such a way its influence permeates everything from the Mass Media to selection of students to join secondary schools and other institutions of higher learning, securing scholarship, employment, promotion, for political office etc. In short the Church is in control of the Executive, Judiciary and the Legislature.

The religious sentiments in Tanzania have become evident even in religious media, especially newspapers. Lupa (2015: 55 – 58) says that religion becomes a justification for people to fight against real and perceived evils, like unjust social-political systems. Even some religious denominations and institutions have established media institutions or media houses to mobilize people, educating them about the importance of having religious unity and brotherhood to have a collective voice against the political dominance of one group. This is exemplified in the document of Project Proposal of The Islamic Foundation (2014: 3 – 4) for the establishment of Imaan Newspaper; the part reads as follows, "Mass media, on the other hand, are the most successful instruments of cultural invasion of our time. Coupled with political, economic and military power, media power is used to control the land and minds of human beings across nations".

Most of the studies on interreligious relations in Tanzania have been conducted from the historical, political, and sociological perspectives. Several scholars such as Tambila, (2006); Rukyaa, (2007); Glickman, (2011); LeSage, (2014); Tetti, (2014); Lawi, (2015); Lucia, (2015); Lupa, (2015); Ndaluka, (2015) have viewed the issues of interreligious tensions in the country as the result of abandoning Ujamaa socialism, the rise of radical and fundamentalist religious teachings, the prejudiced and stereotyped religious orientations, and the growing of mistrusts among various religious groups. Unfortunately, to the best of my literature consultations, I have found that there is no critical study done on how religious newspapers have been framing the religious and political relations in Tanzania to reflect these issues that have been presented in the referred literature. Therefore, my article presents the brief history of media in Tanzania, the role of media in scaling up conflicts in Africa, religious and political relations in Africa, methodology, Fairclough's Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA), Manifestation of Religious and Political relations in Tanzanian Kiswahili Newspapers during 2015 Elections, and it ends with a conclusion. Generally, the analysis has focused on how

those selected religious newspapers framed stories about religious and political relations in Tanzanian society.

Media History in Tanzania

The modern media industry in Tanzania started with the establishment of newspapers. Martin Sturmer traces the history of media in Tanzania from the German administration up to 1996 in his book *The Media History of Tanzania*, published in 1998. The author has described the history of media in Tanzania in four phases. The first phase focused on the German colonial administration (1890 – 1916), when the press served the communication interests of the Germans. Then, missionaries published their newspapers. For example, the Anglican Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) established the first religious newspaper in Zanzibar in 1888. The paper was called *Msimulizi* (Sturmer, 1998). However, the paper lasted for only two years. After the failed *Msimulizi*, the UMCA started other newspapers and in 1890 established *Mtenga Watu* (the old Kiswahili for converter), which was circulated to the Usambara people. They also started another newspaper *Maongezi na Maarifa*, at Magila.

After being installed as an archdeacon, the editor of Maongezi na Maarifa, Mr Woodward, decided to have a professionally-run Kiswahili religious newspaper. In 1894, he started editing another newspaper *Habari za Mwezi* (ibid.). The newspaper was published monthly and is the first official newspaper in the mainland because Msimulizi was published in Zanzibar. *Habari za Mwezi* survived turbulent moments. Its publication ceased temporarily in 1907 before resuming publications in 1908. The outbreak of the First World War ended the newspaper in 1916.

The second phase of the British administration saw newspapers established to support British propaganda. The religious newspapers had suffered a lot after the outbreak of the First World War. It was not until 1925 that *Akayo Katoliki* and *Sauti Yetu* were published in Tabora and Karema, respectively (Sturmer, 1998 citing Scotton, 1972). In the same year, the Dar es Salaam Catholic Diocese launched another paper *Rafiki Yetu*. *Rafiki Yetu,* which ceased published in 1950. It was the most famous religious paper in Tanganyika and some parts of East Africa during the period.

Sturmer also reported that from 1930 to 1950, fewer religious newspapers were published in Tanganyika. He mentions that in March 1927, another newspaper called *Ufalme wa Mungu* was founded and owned by the Evangelical "Bethel-Mission." The Roman Catholic Church of Mwanza launched *Lumuli* in 1934, and two years later, the Kiswahili monthly *Katoliki* was published in Peramiho in 1936. However, *Katoliki* was unsuccessful initially, so they decided to change its name to *Mwenge* in 1964.

The Catholic Diocese of Bukoba established another religious newspaper in 1942 called *Rumuli*, printed in Kiswahili, English, and Haya. In 1948, the Benedictines missionaries of Peramiho launched a journal called *Tatejo,* which was meant for religious teachers, the catechists. Tatejo was later renamed *Mlezi.* The most popular and long-surviving Catholic weekly paper is *Kiongozi.* This paper was founded in Tabora on 1st January 1950. In the beginning, it was published monthly by the White Fathers and strictly carried religious contents. It is now an official newspaper for the Catholic Church in Tanzania, in which many Episcopal announcements and statements are published. Its premises moved from Tabora to Dar es Salaam at the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), and the Bishops

approved its chief editor. It was a must that the editor was supposed to come from among Tanzania's Catholic priests.

Apart from the dominance of Catholic newspapers as a religious media outlet in the country, a few publications owned by other denominations existed; for example, the Anglican Church had the Kiswahili monthly called *Upanga wa Roho*. This paper was published in Kongwa from 1949 to 1964. Also, the Evangelical missionaries published *Bendera ya Kikristo* in Soni from 1955 to 1959. *Bendera ya Kristo* was later replaced by the Lutheran counterpart of *Kiongozi*, which was called *Uhuru na Amani*. Finally, in 1961, the Protestants established a Haya paper *Ija Webonere*, which appeared twice monthly in Bukoba (Sturmer, 1998).

The post-colonial or post-independence of Tanganyika constitutes the third phase. The Tanzania government-controlled media suppressed the opposition during this period while nurturing the newly-found nation by reducing ethnic and religious divisions among Tanganyikans. Moreover, media control later promoted socialistic principles after the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Many religious newspapers ceased publication, but few survived, such as *Kiongozi*, *Mwenge*, and *Mlezi*. The central focus during this period was on the Government's decree on nationalization, socialism, and self-reliance.

The fourth phase of media history in Tanzania refers to the democratisation and liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s. As a result, many independent private press and religious media entered the market. From 1st July 1992, when the then President Ali Hassan Mwinyi signed a decree of a multi-party system in Tanzania, the registration of private media companies became permissible. As a result, many media houses flourished, including religious media outlets. In 1986, Tanzania had only 119 print media, many of which belonged to government ministries, parastatal organisations, agencies, and institutes, and in 1991 before the reintroduction of the multi-party system, there were 180 publications.

The trend had changed drastically from 1994 when the official press directory listed 251 periodicals, and by July 1996, there were about 323 registered newspapers and magazines. In 2015 the Government documented more than 760 registered newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and journals. Out of these, more than 55 were religious newspapers (there is no official number for religious newspapers since the estimated 55 newspapers based on my counting from the list given by the office of the registrar of the newspapers)—the decision to treat certain newspapers as religious was based on ownership patterns.

Role of Media in Scaling up Conflict in Africa

According to Djankov et al. (2003), media are powerful; however, journalists are not influential because they are not autonomous moral agents. They further explain that journalists have a role in scrutinising things while politicians have the legitimacy of persuasion. For journalists to investigate something, they need skills, evidence, and values to not get into trouble with authorities. Yet, politicians do not require skills, proof, and values to execute their duties because journalists become trapped by politicians or used for their interests.

Also, freedom of the press ought to have limits. In this regard, many journalists have got into problems on three key issues: Going against the interests of the constitution; inciting disaffection against the Government (seditious content according to Tanzanian media service act); and having hate propaganda, ethnicity,

deliberate distortion of the truth for personal purposes (irresponsible journalism). Such scenarios have unfolded in many countries, particularly in civil conflicts that erupted because politicians used irresponsible journalists to incite hatred among people along ethnic lines.

The Rwanda Genocide Case and the Media Role

The International Media Support (IMS, 2003) assessment report on Rwanda's media experience with genocide, the media blatantly divided Rwandese people along ethnic lines, whose routes can be traced to the colonial times and resurfaced before the 1994 genocide. The discussion in this sub-section is based on the IMS report by Monique Alexis and Ines Mpambara titled, "The Rwanda media experience from genocide" (2003).

1. *Political Background of Rwanda*

When the German colonialists arrived in Rwanda in the 19th century, they found three ethnic groups: The Twa (1%), the Tutsi (16%), and the Hutu (over 80%). The Germans favoured the Tutsi, a minority as a ruling class in their Government. After WWI, the Belgians made a similar mistake of favouring the Tutsi in their administration when they left Rwanda. On the other hand, the Catholic Church became the leading social institution in Rwanda after WWI. The Church also sided with Belgians in giving educational priority to the Tutsis. The Hutus had to study theology only to become priests or servants in the church. With the theology qualification, the Hutu were not qualified to be employed in the Government, making them angry and frustrated.

After WWII, the atmosphere changed drastically in Rwanda between 1945 and 1962. During this period, the Catholic Church began to favour the growth of Hutu elites. Seeing that the Church was no longer in favour of them, the Tutsi elites moved towards colonial social order and fully supported colonialists. The Church used its monthly newspaper called *'Kinyamateka'* to bring changes. Slowly the Hutu became organised after getting support from one of the leading social institutions—the Catholic Church. Eventually, the first Hutu political parties were formed: The Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) and another Association pour la Promotion Sociale de Masses (APROSOMA). The Tutsi also had their parties: The Union National Rwandaise (UNAR) and the Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER).

2. *Role of Media in Fuelling Genocide*

In 1974, the Government of Rwanda established the l'Office Rwandais d'Information (ORINFOR), which is synonymous with Tanzania's Information Services Department, whose director was the Government's spokesperson. The President appointed Ferdinand Nahimana in 1990 as a Director of ORINFOR, replacing the former director who retired from the office after serving since its establishment in 1974. Nahimana was a university professor known for his extremist political ideas and prejudices against the Tutsi. The nomination of Nahimana reinforced MRND, the ruling party's control over ORINFOR. However, Nahimana did not stay long in office because he was dismissed in 1992 due to his inflammatory messages and censoring of opposition leaders' speeches.

On the other hand, the Catholic Church owned a monthly newspaper called *Kinyamateka*. The newspaper was established in 1933, and its substantial presence in Rwanda was due to its owner, the Catholic Church, being the oldest institution in the country. The newspaper increased from 1955 when Gregoire Kayibanda was its chief editor. This Kinyamateka played a crucial role in 1959's social revolution. In addition, the newspaper mobilised the Hutu to fight for political representation in the colonial Government primarily because the chief editor was also a political activist and later president of the republic.

From 1990, the presses backed by the president's closest circles run undisguised hate speeches against the Tutsi. One of those newspapers was *Kangura*, whose main goal was to mobilise people to support President Habyarimana on an ethnic ideology that excluded the Tutsis and criticise the content of another newspaper called *Kanguka*. *Kangura* published the infamous 10 Hutu commandments that incited hatred and discrimination against the Tutsi. The newspaper claimed that the Tutsi were dangerous people and should be stopped. Among those Hutu 10 Commandments, the tenth commandment reads:

> Any Hutu must know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for her Tutsi ethnic group. Therefore, any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman, or who has a Tutsi concubine or who hires a Tutsi secretary, or protects a Tutsi woman, that Hutu is a traitor. Every Hutu must widely disseminate this ideology. Any Muhutu who persecutes his Muhutu brother for having read, spread, and taught this ideology is a traitor (IMS, 2003: 17).

Notably, the radicalisation of newspapers and radios in Rwanda did not happen overnight. The rise of hate media and the preparation for the genocide had been building up over time. Finally, it reached a point the media called the Tutsis 'cockroaches.' The Hutu media owners used their media to encourage and mobilise fellow Hutus to kill Tutsis and even moderate Hutus. This Rwanda mayhem hints at what could happen if media were left to spread hate messages and mobilize people along sectarian, religious, or ethnic lines.

Role of Media in Conflicts in Kenya and Nigeria

According to Ahere (2019:6), most media companies are owned by influential politicians and businesspersons in Kenya. These politicians include the family of the former President Daniel Moi, who owns Standard Media and publishes The Standard, Saturday Standard, Sunday Standard, The Nairobian. Also, the family of President Uhuru Kenyatta owns Mediamax Network Limited, which publishes *People Daily* and several radio and TV stations. Apart from the presidents' families, former members of the Parliament and prominent politician Samuel Kamau Macharia owns Royal Media Services Limited; and Patrick Quarcoo, William Pike, and Tiso Blackstar Group own Radio Africa Group.

The infamous Post-Election Violence (PEV) erupted in Kenya in 2007. During the PEV, some journalists were linked to violence because they allegedly used their media to incite violence and killings. One of those journalists was Joshua Arap Sang, who was sued at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and later acquitted after the court dismissed their case. The violence implicated Uhuru Kenyatta and

his Vice President, William Ruto. The family of Uhuru Kenyatta owns the media company Mediamax Network Limited which operates K24 and Kameme Television networks and several radio stations. Based on this line of ownership, one can argue that politicians can easily influence their media to frame stories in their favour and the disfavour of their opponents.

Akpan, Ering, and Olofu-Adeoye (2013:2281 – 86) explain the most reported crises: The Niger Delta, Boko Haram, and Jos. Many analysts have been asking themselves how the media reported these crises in Nigeria. Is there a significant relationship between the environment and media reportage? In what ways have media reportage enhanced or reduced these conflicts?" (Akpan, Ering & Olofu-Adeoye, 2013). The authors contend that "The kind of information the media disseminates, how it does it, why it does it, and who its target audience is, to a large extent, is significantly influenced by its environment." Implicitly, journalists and media are primarily influenced by their respective environments. In these conflicts, journalists face challenges of failing to decide what to omit and what to report as the Government has been harping on the fact that media exacerbate conflict.

The authors further explain that poor reporting of the crises is caused by 'political, socio-economic, sectarian, ethnic and other crises' (Akpan, Ering and Olofu-Adeoye, 2013). They attribute these crises and conflicts to poor governance. The media also operate in the same environment of poor governance. This situation mainly applies to government-owned media, often touted as 'anti-people' media, because they do not report the side of the victims, particularly in the developing country contexts. One of the examples of unbalanced reporting of the government media agencies is ignoring the hardships that people faced in the oil-producing Niger Delta region. When the youth in the area felt that they did not receive much media attention, they decided to "respond to [the] government repressive policy with violence, vandalization of oil installations and kidnapping of foreign oil workers" (Akpan, Ering and Olofu-Adeoye, 2013:2283). Following the emergence of violence in the region, the media started to pay attention to the crisis. Usually, the media industry tends to pay much attention to problems like what transpired in Nigeria.

Moreover, Ndolo (2013) contends that media in Nigeria have contributed to the normalisation of conflicts and failing to expose the crimes and the rot in Government by prominent politicians and military officers. Apart from mentioning poor remunerations and lack of education, there was a reported elevated level of corruption in the media (Ndolo, 2013). Sometimes, extort gifts from various people, including politicians, and because of that, they do not provide room for stories of poor people humiliated, oppressed, and ostracised by the Government.

Religious and political relations in Africa

Abbink (2014: 4) defines religion as "deeply felt commitment and a collective instrument of community formation, thus often leading to a ‘politics of identity.” He further explains that religion is not restricted to the discourse of morality, but politicians use it to keep their powers and influence. Fox (1998: 122) explained that religion produces fundamentalists who have a remarkable ability to mobilise the masses because what they speak, act, or write an appeal to people’s feelings of discontent. They only rely on belief to mobilise their adherents for a particular action.

It is very typical to observe the existence of antipathy or hostility between two separated groups of people who share a common origin. This is seen between different denominations of Christianity, Christianity and Jewish, Christianity and Islam, and Islamic sects. This also happens between political parties whose founders share a similar origin, and they were forced to part ways in their lives because of specific unresolved differences. This antipathy can divide the nations politically, religiously, ethnically, or socially to have some factionists or terrorist groups.

Rapoport, cited by Fox (1999:433), further explains that although religions have a higher propensity for violence than others, all major religions have enormous potential for creating and directing followers to engage in violent acts. We can refer to Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Anti-Balaka and Seleka in the Central African Republic, Shiites in Iraq, etc. Religions were also involved in cruel acts such as the inquisition by the Catholic Church in Europe and liberation theology in Latin America by Catholic theologians such as Father Gustavo Gutierez (who is hailed as the father of Liberation Theology). Others who promoted it include Leonardo Boff, Clodovis Boff, Jon Sobrino, Oscar Romero and Juan Luis Segundo (de Rooij & Burity, 2015).

Religious institutions can affect politics because they provide intra-societal gatherings and informal communication networks. They sometimes organise their members for political actions. For example, in 2010, the Tanzania Episcopal Conference wrote an encyclical to all Catholics about elections. The Bishops of Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) also produced a circular for all churches. Also, Muslims in 2015 wrote messages to call upon all Muslims in the country to support Prof Lipumba as a Presidential candidate for the opposition.

Another reason for political mobilisation is to seek the status quo. As I explained above, one of the categories of religions is to oppose the existing status quo, so when religious-related grievances increase, religious institutions use religious newspapers to mobilise adherents to take action. We have seen some radicalised and militant groups mobilising themselves along religious lines to oppose the status quo in the world. These groups include Hamas in Israel/Palestine, Seleka and Anti-Balaka in the Central African Republic, Blacks in the USA, and Catholic Bishops in the Democratic Republic of Congo opposing the extension of the tenure of Joseph Kabila.

When there are repressive and autocratic governments, there is a possibility of emerging dissident and rebellious religious movements that can be violent when the authorities do not heed their grievances. They resolve into rebellion to pursue particular political agenda. This happens when "anything that religious believer perceives as a predicament to the religious framework constitutes an existential threat" (Fox 1998: 46). Here, religious frameworks refer to specific rules that followers or believers must follow and shape their behaviours.

Method

I collected primary data from the religious newspapers published weekly from January 2015 to December 2015, and secondary data came from the interviews and focus group discussions. During this period, media, including religious newspapers, behaved differently compared to other times. The framing of religious relations, politics, and power struggles were conspicuous between January and December

2015. And that intrigued more speculations to find why they happened during that time and the trend for the whole year.

The list of selected newspapers was obtained from the Office of the Newspapers' Registrar under the Director of Information Services. About 55 registered religious newspapers, periodicals, journals, and magazines from that list. Upon registration, the applicants were supposed to fill in Form No 2 (statement of particulars to support application). Furthermore, they had to indicate in the form the anticipated number of copies for each publication. In addition, they had to state the policy of the newspaper. Almost all the registered religious newspapers indicated that they would carry religious content in their publications. Therefore, for this study, we chose four newspapers; two Christian and two Islamic; and these were Msemakweli and Nyakati (Christian); Al-Huda and Annur (Islamic). After collecting the newspapers, I identified stories framed about religious and political relations.

Three main reasons for choosing these four newspapers published in 2015 were; first, the newspaper must be owned by religious institutions or organisations and not an individual who has a media company. I picked the religious newspapers that belonged to religious institutions, even if individuals established those institutions. With this criterion, all the religious newspapers qualified except Kisiwa, Mizani, and Msamaria, private media outlets.

Secondly, I chose the newspapers that were published from January to December. In this case, the *Imaan* newspaper was eliminated because its production started in April 2015. And the third reason was that they should primarily have published content related to elections, politics, and interreligious relations in Tanzania. Based on the third criterion, the newspapers owned by the Catholic and Lutheran churches seemed to have refrained very much from publishing issues related to politics and general elections. Still, they engaged in the contentious 'Kadhi' Court debate from the beginning of 2015 up to May 2015. Thus, they were excluded from the study, although in some instances, *Upendo* newspaper attempted writing positively on Edward Lowassa. The newspapers consistent in their publications on politicians, politics, and elections in 2015 were *Al-Huda*, *An-Nuur*, *Msema Kweli,* and *Nyakati*, hence their selection for this study.

The texts were divided into two parts. The first part involved the pre-election period – between January and July when the names of the presidential candidates were not yet known; and the second period covered a period from July to December – that included the nomination process, campaigns, elections, and post-election period. During the pre-election period, the religious newspapers wrote much about the relations between the two religions, Christianity and Islam, mostly hinged on the Kadhi court debate.

Fairclough's Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis (TODA)

Fairclough considers *social structure* as social relations in society alone and specific institutions (1992: 64), including discursive practices such as journalism and public relations (1992: 66). One of the issues addressed in the CDA by using Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis is an intertextual analysis. According to Fairclough, this offers a textual basis for answering questions about social resources and experiences drawn upon in the reception and interpretation of media messages and what other domains of life media messages are linked or assimilated to in

interpretation (Fairclough, 1992: 204). TODA is considered necessary in studying the reception of media messages and how they are used and transformed in various spheres of life, such as family, work, political activities, leisure activities, religion, etc.

So, the decision to apply TODA is based on its appropriateness in analysing framing in Kiswahili religious newspapers to understand how they manifest religious and political relations. This is exemplified by Fairclough (2003:3), who says: "no real understanding of the social effects of discourse is possible without looking closely at what happens when people talk or write." Therefore, TODA focuses on texts, discursive practices, and social practices. This approach extends the previous CDA that Fairclough developed in analysing discourse (cf. Fairclough, 2001, 2000, 1995, 1992; and Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Therefore, TODA is "based upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always have to take account of language" (Fairclough, 2003:2).

TODA is one of the effective forms of discourse analysis for researching language use which is socially placed. Fairclough further explains that we reduce social life to language by using Textually Oriented Discourse Analysis. That is, we do not mean that everything is discourse. Instead, it is necessary to understand that texts as social events have causal effects, bringing about changes. We suggest that texts immediately change our knowledge by bringing modifications, as it happens when we read newspapers, articles, books, or any written document. Fairclough has argued while citing other writers (Eagleton 1991, Larrain 1994, Thompson 1995, Van Dijk 1998) that one of the causal effects of texts are ideological effects whereby texts are considered to inculcate and sustain or change ideologies. Ideologies in this context are understood as "representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination, and exploitation" (Fairclough, 2003:9).

When we analyse specific texts, we look at them in terms of the three aspects of meaning, namely, action, representation, and identification, and how these are realized in various features of texts (vocabulary, grammar, etc.). Second, we connect the concrete social events and more abstract social practices by asking which genres, discourses, and styles are drawn upon here. Third, we look at how different genres, discourses, and styles are articulated in the text? (Fairclough, 2003:37). TODA studies how social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context (Ibid: 352). So, TODA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimize, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society.

Since the relations of participants in the society where discourse is produced are not equal, we need TODA to analyze religious and political relations. Through TODA, we can get the meanings in the interactions between readers of religious newspapers through the description, interpretation, and explanation of the linguistic and non-linguistic features used in those newspapers to identify religious and political relations. Religious newspapers fall within socio-political dimensions since their production is governed or controlled by social and religious powers.

Manifestation of Religious and Political relations in Tanzanian Kiswahili Newspapers during 2015 Elections

Richardson (2007: 221) says, 'journalism is connected to the social, political and cultural context in written and consumed.' This is true with Tanzanian Kiswahili religious newspapers because they are not different from mainstream newspapers. They are produced under a similar political and cultural context. Therefore, these newspapers do not only shape society but also manifest what is happening in society. This happens in different ways because newspapers are material forms of ideology; they are the sites of class struggle. This has been happening between Christians and Muslims through their respective newspapers that establish or sustain relations of domination. But above all these, newspapers create specific claims to make them look like common sense by naturalising certain discursive practices. For instance, this happens when newspapers want people to believe class differences are part of human nature, and there is no way we can address them. Eventually, people will take that as a regular thing, and there will be no efforts to address them.

There is a relationship between religious newspapers and society because discourse constantly reproduces and represents social relations. It can reproduce unequal or equal social relations. This is always the case because there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure. Discourse helps to construct social identities and subject positions – this is what we call the identity function of language. Discourse can also represent relationships between people – it is what we call the relational function of language. Furthermore, discourse contributes to the construction of knowledge and belief systems – this is called the ideational function of language.

Each media house has specific goals or purposes during the focus group discussion with editors and senior journalists. For example, one of the respondents said: *kila chombo cha habari kinaanzishwa kwa malengo maalumu, na malengo yale ndiyo yanayosimamia house style ya chombo husika* (each media house is established with specific goals, and it is from those goals the house style is maintained – R1). Therefore, the media owner justifies controlling the newsroom's content, editorial policies, and politics from those goals.

However, other respondents cautioned about the media owners, especially the religious leaders, as they misuse that freedom to force their editors not to respect professionalism. They said that if each religious institution decides to support a particular candidate, it will be chaos and confusion. As one participant said: *Katika hili la vyombo vya habari vya dini, wakati mwingine tunashuhudia kwamba labda kanisa fulani wanaona wagombea wa aina gani wamesimamishwa...let say labda Waanglikani wenyewe maono yao wanaona labda Magufuli akichaguliwa litakuwa pendekezo lao na wengine wanaona akisimama Lowassa wao ndo pendekezo lao... wanatoka nje ya usajili wao* (in this issue of religious media houses, sometimes we witness particular churches decide to support specific candidates ... let say Anglicans decide to support Magufuli and others choose to support Lowassa... they are violating the terms of the registration).

Journalists and editors are sometimes coerced to obey the orders; consequently, their editorial freedom is lost. The participants in the focused group discussion expressed their views that media owners were unfair to the journalists and the public by forcing their candidates to occupy the space in the newspapers. They said that this tarnishes the credibility of the newspapers and affects the newspaper's sales

because the readers who will be unhappy with the editorial changes of the newspaper will decide not to buy it.

Even politicians know that during elections, media are divided; each politician will struggle to get support from religious leaders who own media or religious institutions that own media houses. With that understanding, the secretary-general of Tanzania Editors' Forum (TEF) and the former manager of ethics and mediation committee of Media Council of Tanzania said that politicians do not bother much to file arbitration and mediation cases against newspapers that write badly about them. As the secretary of TEF said: ...*hata wakati mwingine kwa mfano mtu akilalamikia story, unamwambia okay umelalamikia story unataka tufanyeje?Anakuambia acha ibaki hivyo hivyo, sitaki kulumbana kwenye magazeti...mimi inanipa picha kuwa...wanazo sides nyingi za maisha kwahiyo anaona wataumbuana...atacomplain kawaida lakini ni wepesi wa kusahau, basi uchaguzi ukiisha na mambo hayo yanakuwa ya kawaida* (sometimes someone complains to you about the story so and so and you ask them what do you want us to do? They will tell you to let it go; I don't want to argue with newspapers...this gives me a picture that they have various hidden sides of life. They are afraid of exposing them... the person will usually complain, but they easily forego them, and after elections, things normalise).

However, some senior journalists had different opinions on that. They said it was not the question of aspirations of getting titles after elections; instead, it was an issue of money. Some editors approach the political candidates and entice some bribes to write good things about them in exchange for money and nothing else. Journalist R2 said, *mimi naangalia tumbo langu, akishinda atakuwa ameenda, bora nimtumie sasa hivi…kuna viongozi wanaotumika wanataka hela… siyo kwa vyombo vya dini tu hata hivi vya binafsi* (I look at my stomach, once he wins the election, he will have gone, I better make use of him now… some leaders want money… and this is not only for religious media but also for private media).

The tendency of siding with possible winning candidates was so evident in 2015 when several religious leaders sided with Edward Lowassa with hopes that he could be the next president. Still, after the election, they abandoned him and started supporting President Magufuli, who won the election. This was testified by R3 who said: *Kuna kiongozi mmoja wa dini jina simtaji ila alipata pesa nyingi sana kupitia uchaguzi wa 2015 na alienda na huyo mgombea ana alipoona mgombea amekwama na yeye akajiondoa akahamia upande mwingine. Na viongozi wa namna hii tunao ndani ya taifa* (One religious leader, whose name I don't want to disclose, received a lot of money during the 2015 elections and supported the candidate until he was defeated and left him and crossed to the other side. We have so many leaders of this kind in our nation). R1 adds that such types of religious leaders do always emerge during elections. They were there whenever there was an election to get new presidents. It happened in 1995, in 2005, and 2015.

Another aspect that emerged in 2015 before the election was a debate on Kadhi Court. This issue manifested the nature of religious relations in Tanzania. And in fact, the case of the Kadhi court surfaced after the Constitution review process was halted. In the New Constitution, an Article proposed the establishment of Kadhi court, and Muslims hoped that the constitution could be passed during the Special Constitution Assembly. However, the atmosphere changed when President Jakaya

Kikwete spoke in favour of two government structures instead of the proposed three government structures presented by the Constitution Review Commission.

Some Christian newspapers presented the whole issue of Kadhi Court as dangerous to Christians. The newspapers campaigned against it and made sure that Christians got informed about how dangerous Kadhi Court was to them and how their freedom of worship would be ruined or jeopardised by the presence of the Kadhi Courts. Furthermore, they made Christians believe that Muslims charged in the Kadhi Court and Christians will be included. They went further by claiming that since there is hatred between Muslims and Christians, Muslims will use the Kadhi Court system to punish Christians and even force them into Islam. Christians quickly accepted these threats, including the Members of Parliament; thus, it was easy for them to rally against its introduction in Tanzania.

The Christian newspapers also considered Kadhi courts' imposition of Islamic laws in Tanzania. This claim has its background as the Government of Tanzania in 2015 allowed the establishment of the Kadhi court. Initially, the Muslims wanted the courts to be mainstreamed in the existing judicial system, and the Government had to cover the running costs. That proposal outraged Christians who complained that all Tanzanians were paying taxes, but they did not find why part of the taxes should be used to run the Kadhi courts whose purpose was to serve one religion's interest. In the story under the headline in Nyakati, *Mahakama ya Kadhi ni mtego – Maaskofu* (Kadhi court is a trap – Bishops), we are told that Christians were not happy with it because it could divide the nation. As a result, the Christians will be forced to obey the court. But, at the same time, they are not part of it.

On the other hand, Muslims have also developed a different negative perception about Christians. Since the 1990s, the relations between Christians and Muslims have been icy, especially at the upper levels of elites, but at the grassroots, the interfaith relations have been stable. The Islamic elites have been claiming four things as their primary concerns. These four concerns include Christian hegemony (famously known as 'Mfumo Kristo'); inequalities between Christians and Muslims in terms of wealth, education, politics, and employment, mistreatments of Muslims, and obstructing the emancipation of Muslims in the country (cf. Mbogoni, 2004; Said, 2014).

Most of the headlines in Islamic newspapers mobilised Muslims to unite against the Government and the Christians. A headline in Al-Huda went as, *Wabunge wenye udini wanahatarisha usalama wa taifa* (Members of the Parliament with religious biases threaten the national security). The newspaper avoided the fallacy of hasty generalisation as it specified those Members of Parliament who had a religious intolerance. It did not consider all Christian MPs as religiously biased because some MPs from the opposition defended the establishment of the Kadhi Courts. However, there were few from the opposition who opposed the bill. The Parliament was split into religious camps, but many Christian MPs voted against the bill during voting. That is why the Muslims considered it a war between Christians and Muslims.

Other headlines in Al-Huda called for action on the side of the Government. For example, the headline such as *Waislamu wataka Kadhi kabla ya Aprili* (Muslims want to have Kadhi before April), can signify two things; first, a report of what Muslims wish to get; and secondly, it is an order to the Government or relevant authorities that they should make sure Muslims get Kadhi before April.

This headline was supported by another headline, *Mahakama ya Kadhi iendeshwe na serikali* (the Government should run the Kadhi Court).

After the bill of establishing the Kadhi Court was 'quashed' by the Parliament, the Muslims lost hope of reviving it. They first made efforts to incorporate it in the New Constitution, but the process did not end, so they had to take that as a separate plan and present it to the Government. They hoped that the Government could implement it under the Muslim President. Later, after the Christian-dominated Parliament quashed the Kadhi court issue, the newspaper came with the headline, *Waislamu kutorudia makosa* (Muslims will never repeat the mistakes). This story was a call to Muslims as the country headed towards general elections in October. The newspaper urged Muslims to vie for various political posts and sign contracts with Muslims so that once they win, they should not ignore the interests of their fellow Muslims. And non-Muslim leaders should also agree to put forward the interests of Muslims.

The feeling that Bishops pressure the Government to suppress Muslims is exemplified in An-Nuur in the following headline, *Kwaheri Mahakama ya Kadhi, ni matokeo ya kambi ya Maaskofu Dodoma* (farewell Kadhi Court, it is the aftermath of Bishops' camp in Dodoma). The story referred to the Government's decision of presenting the bill on establishing the Kadhi court to the Parliament did not please the Muslims. Muslims wanted the president to use his extraordinary powers to decree that the Kadhi court would be established within the existing judicial system. However, that could be an unlawful decision and unconstitutional as well.

The matter was sent to the Parliament to pass it as a law, and the Government could enforce it. But Christians were against it, and they rallied in Dodoma and Dar es Salaam to raise their voices against establishing the Kadhi court. Since most MPs were Christians, the religious leaders met with their MPs, discussed the matter, and resolved to stand as one voice against it. And that is why the newspaper expresses the sad mood of Muslims about the failed attempt to pass the law on Kadhi Court. Ironically, it is made and written to arouse Muslims' feelings that their enemy that blocked the Kadhi Court were bishops. It told Muslims that their issues with the Government and other state pillars would not succeed as long as bishops would put their hand on or not be satisfied.

To demonstrate further, An-Nuur has been bitter at the relationship between the Government and Christians. Another heading reads *MoU ni ubaguzi, udini mtupu* (MoU is full of discrimination, religious bias). The other headline is *Serikali yadaiwa kutosimama katika uadilifu* (the Government is accused of not being fair). These two headlines show that the trust between Muslims and Christians is not there. We can deduce from the headlines that the Government is discriminatory, and it puts more emphasis on issues that touch the welfare of Christians and not of Muslims. This belief existed before the 1990s, but after the emergence of some radical Muslim teachers and the emergence of IPC in 1991, the reintroduction of the multi-party system gave Muslims more courage to speak out their grievances. It was difficult to raise such issues during the totalitarian regime of a single party.

Moreover, the Islamic newspapers claim that the ruling party, CCM, does not show any determination in its manifesto to fulfil its pledges about Muslims. The newspapers have been reminding of the promise in the manifesto of 2010 that it would establish Kadhi Courts. However, it is considered a promise meant to attract

votes from Muslims. One of its headlines shows this, *CCM yawabamiza tena Masheikh (*CCM thrashes the Sheikhs again). Another headline related to it is, *Mheshimiwa alikosea, Askofu hawezi kuwa gaidi* (Honourable MP erred; a bishop cannot be a terrorist).

The two headlines refer to the cases of Revival (Uamsho) sheikhs in Zanzibar. They were arrested because they instigated the killings of Christian clerics in Zanzibar and incited hatred between Christians and Muslims. On top of that, the Revival Sheikhs were said to teach radical Islam, causing fear in Zanzibar. So, Uamsho leaders were arrested and detained without being sent to court for a long time pending investigation. Now the newspaper has been accusing the Government under CCM in Zanzibar to torture Muslims to maintain power grips.

An-Nuur has also been bitter at Muslims, claiming Muslims present themselves as weak or inferior, or sometimes they treat themselves as inactive. The newspaper says that some Muslims condone the situation as they fail to take action against the mistreatments they get from the Government and Christians. This is expressed in the headline that reads, *Bar mbele ya Kibla ziondolewe kwa mikono sio kwa kupiga kunuti* (Pubs in front of Kiblah will only be demolished by taking action and not by prayers). *Kunuti* means prayers in Islam. Thus, the story implies that prayers cannot solve Muslims' problems. Instead, they should move out of their Mosques and take action against oppression and discrimination.

Conclusion

We have seen the perceptions of Islamic and Christian newspapers on religious and political relations. Inequalities exacerbate religious tensions and conflicts in a country where religious diversity is enormous, like Tanzania. Certain politicians and religious elites can use religious newspapers to mobilise people, thus contributing to political and religious split in the country.

Devereux (2007: 150 – 154) gives us reflection as we conclude our article. He has discussed how ideology works in media. He says that power exercises itself through ideology. This statement means that power is exercised through unequal political relations based upon class, ethnicity, religious background, gender, etc. Ideology is a tool to maintain power through legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation, and reification.

Legitimation means unequal political relationships created and maintained by being presented in media as legitimate and for ‘everybody’s interest. Media will show that the existence of social classes is not something to fight against because the existing power is doing better for everybody in society. However, some media will be reminding people that what they are told is not true; instead, they are reminding them that there are classes. This is what has been happening between Islamic and Christian media. Islamic newspapers have been writing about inequalities, while Christian newspapers have been silent about them.

Another function of ideology is dissimulation. This occurs when relations of domination, such as gender inequality, religious biases, racism, are denied, hidden, or obscured. Media, including newspapers, will not explicitly show the realities about these vices to maintain the powers of men, a religious group, race, and so on. The excuse is that society will have instability once we reveal those class differences. Unification is also one of the functions of ideology. It means that hegemonic or dominant ideology unifies members of a society into a collective

entity – this is usually done in opposition to a real or imagined enemy. It tends to use a term such as 'we are as a family against them.' For example, when Tanzania faces an enemy outside, the Government will tell Tanzanians that we are one thing and should unite against that enemy. This has been happening with religious newspapers; Islamic newspapers have been mobilising fellow Muslims to be as one family against 'Christian hegemony'; likewise, Christian newspapers have been urging to be as one thing against Muslims on Kadhi court.

Sometimes ideology functions through fragmentation. Fragmentation is a tool of ideology whereby hegemony is achieved and maintained through dividing or fragmenting the potential opposition and thus reducing or removing the perceived 'threat' they might otherwise pose. This happens, for instance, when the ruling party uses clandestine means to create misunderstandings within opposition parties so that they keep on fighting internally and the ruling party stays comfortably in Power (Devereux, 2007: 153).

The last function of ideology is reification. Devereux (2007: 154) states that it is similar to legitimation, but there is a slight difference. Society is told that unequal social structures are natural and inevitable with reification. They will insist that God destined that there should be enslaved people and masters and that it is challenging to get rid of classes and inequalities. In addition to that, some members of a society accept that as divine truth. However, some will still question the validity of that justification and keep on fighting against the authorities. Still, they will not succeed because many will be made to believe that inequality is divine providence.

Therefore, it is not the question of how the framing of newspapers manifested the religious and political relations in Tanzania; instead, we should always understand that even religious newspapers can be used as tools for ideology. Groups that resist dominance and want freedom will emerge as we see the tension between Christians and Muslims in Tanzania. No group is ready to allow another group to dominate politics, education, employment, and social services. They are always in the struggle for power and domination.

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